What is going on in Sudan
What is going on in Sudan
As fighting in Sudan reaches the one-year mark, it is time to examine the circumstances and dynamics that have led to this devastating conflict.
On April 15, 2023, the streets of Khartoum turned into a battleground. After months of tension, the two armed factions of Sudan turned to their weapons and started fighting over disagreements about Sudan's future, putting a halt to the greatest democratization movement in the country's history. After a year of fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the toll is staggering: tens of thousands of civilians are dead, millions are displaced, and the country is teetering on the brink of collapse, with food insecurity taking over1.
The current conflict in Sudan can be understood as a domestic dispute between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (RSF), who both lead Sudan’s military factions and are unwilling to cede their influence to each other, especially to the Sudanese people2. Understanding the conflict today means understanding the circumstances that brought forth this unstable constellation, as well as the domestic issues that have led to this dire outlook for Sudan.
One man’s legacy
Sudan’s current turmoil cannot be solely attributed to one individual, as the nation’s challenges stem from a complex historical context. However, the actions of Omar al-Bashir have played a pivotal role in shaping the country’s trajectory and conflict today3. On June 30, 1989, Omar al-Bashir, then a military officer, orchestrated a military coup that overthrew the Sudanese government. Unlike previous military coups, al-Bashir did not maintain the facade of "wanting to establish a civilian government" or "holding democratic elections." Instead, he immediately dissolved the Sudanese parliament and banned all political parties, laying the foundations of his military regime.
For the majority of Sudan’s history, or to be exact, for 52 of its 65 years of independence, the military has held control of the country4. Omar Al-Bashir’s regime not only cemented this status but continued to build on it and further entrenched the Sudanese Armed Forces into government institutions and the domestic economy. But Omar Al-Bashir was not stupid – “he knew that statistically, if one were to gain power through a coup, they’d be likely to lose power to a coup,” says Hager Ali, a doctoral fellow at GIGA Hamburg.
So as part of his coup-proofing strategy, Al-Bashir bet on compartmentalisation of the military’s competences, as Hager Ali’s research revealed5. When rebellions broke out in Darfur in 2003 and the SAF was spread thin, Al-Bashir’s regime resorted to funding local militias with proceeds of the country’s vast natural resources, utilizing ethnic tensions in order to respond to the revolts6. These militias were known as the Janjaweed, and they would set out to commit one of the worst genocides in 21st-century history78. Out of the Janjaweed emerged the Rapid Support Forces. While the Sudan Armed Forces have historically served as a talent pool for government roles in Khartoum, and would continue to do so, the newly founded paramilitary group RSF would focus on counterinsurgency.
This balancing act of rivaling powers created an inherently unstable situation and would eventually prove futile when both factions ousted Al-Bashir on April 11, 2019. The incredible pressure from the democratization movement of the Sudanese people, as well as a depressing economic outlook under Al-Bashir’s rule, led to the RSF and SAF combining their forces in a coup d’état. “With Daglo (RSF) coming to Khartoum to join the transitional military council, the artificial separation of competences, with the Sudanese Armed Forces as the government force in Khartoum and the Rapid Support Forces as solely responsible for counterinsurgency in the periphery, had ended,” said Hager Ali.
A stolen revolution
The democratization of Sudan still faces several challenges. While Al-Bashir was ousted, his institutional legacies remain. Sudan does not have a point of reference for democratic institutions and, as in the past, must start from scratch in building a civilian government. Meanwhile, the split military factions of the country, namely the SAF and RSF, not only have to worry about their status in a democratic Sudan — which they would never willingly give up — but also deal with potential coups from other cells within the Sudanese security apparatus.
After Al-Bashir's ousting, a Transitional Military Council (TMC) was established with the goal of restoring full civilian rule. Yet in the midst of this progression, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) took full control in 2021. Facing international and domestic pressure, negotiations with civilian parties for democratization would continue, but ultimately fail at the security reform, which would entail the RSF being integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces9. If enforced, it would have essentially led to the Rapid Support Forces giving up all autonomy, as well as the benefits it entails – such as the personal enrichment through the control of gold mines in Darfur. As the negotiations on the reform stalled, tensions rose and eventually led to the fighting we see in Sudan today.
Fighting originally broke out in Khartoum, but the warfare now encompasses the entire country. “The current war can be characterized as modern trench warfare,” Hager Ali said. “While one party may be able to achieve small victories on one front, it is difficult to attribute overall victories to either side. In a war of attrition, it’s really not about firepower but the ability to sustain continuous fighting.” Her research reveals that, in order to do so, both parties are increasingly relying on recruiting local militias, exploiting existing ethnic tensions, offering bounties, or threatening violence. There have even been reports of the deployment of child soldiers10. The limited resources of both parties still somewhat restrict the territorial extent of the warfare. The localization and fragmentation of this war have led to numerous human rights violations, such as genocide and the pillaging of civilian villages, as the parties struggle to enforce their military commands on a local level to control newly recruited troops, as Hager describes in her paper (which you can find here).
The war has now become about either party implementing their vision for Sudan. As the SAF has already been an important player in Sudan for decades, the RSF has to catch up in building the infrastructure to legitimize itself domestically and even internationally. Naturally, this conflict has become a playground for regional players to project power. The RSF has received and continues to receive significant logistical support from the United Arab Emirates, for whom the gold trade out of Sudan is crucial. The UAE imports more gold from African states than their total official export records would indicate, which is also true for Sudan. Moderate estimates attribute around 80% of Sudan’s gold exports to illegal smuggling to the UAE11. The Russian Wagner Group also plays an important role in logistical support, as for them Sudan is just another piece in the puzzle for Africa12. There have even been reports of meetings between Daglo and Israeli Intelligence, as the Sudanese Red Sea coast poses an interesting geopolitical and economic asset to Israel13.
After a year of fighting, the outlook for the situation improving is grim. "The RSF's self-perception as a victor prevents them from joining the SAF in negotiations for a potential power-sharing situation," explains Hager Ali. As long as both parties continue to receive logistical support and consider their outlook on absolute victory promising, Al-Burhan and Dagalo will probably not settle their power dispute peacefully. All the while, the Sudanese civil population is suffering under mass displacement and facing starvation, especially since humanitarian aid is held hostage by the SAF or RSF in order to weaken areas held by the other respective party.
As the situation in Sudan is primarily a domestic issue, the capabilities of outside actors are limited. It is essential to cut off the RSF and SAF from arms shipments and their financial infrastructures. Humanitarian aid to the refugees who have fled to neighboring countries needs to be increased. Even though all eyes in the region are currently on Gaza, Sudan should not be forgotten in the international dialogue.
Big thank you to Hager Ali, who has provided many important insights and whose research has been crucial in understanding the situation in Sudan. You can find all of her publications and links here.
https://unric.org/en/the-un-and-the-crisis-in-sudan/
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan#:~:text=As%20the%20civil%20war%20enters,displacement%20crisis%20in%20the%20world
https://theconversation.com/omar-al-bashir-brutalised-sudan-how-his-30-year-legacy-is-playing-out-today-204391
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/reversing-military-coup-sudan
https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publikationen/giga-focus/the-war-in-sudan-how-weapons-and-networks-shattered-a-power-struggle
https://origins.osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict?language_content_entity=en
https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sudan-2nd-civil-war-darfur/
https://enoughproject.org/reports/sudans-deep-state-how-insiders-violently-privatized-sudans-wealth-and-how-respond
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-talks-hit-roadblock-over-security-sector-reform-2023-03-30/
https://www.newarab.com/analysis/are-rsf-recruiting-children-fight-sudans-war
https://www.alestiklal.net/en/article/gold-is-the-password-why-does-the-uae-support-hemedti-in-his-war-against-the-sudanese-army
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65328165
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-crisis-how-israel-stands-gain